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ship in a state bar association does not afford the public any more protection in patent matters than they already possess by virtue of the rigorous examination given by the Patent Office to all who desire to be
licensed by it.'5
Since it is doubtful whether the Florida Supreme Court appreciated
the true significance of its decision in the Sperry case,'" the better view
is that expressed by the Franklin County Court of Appeals. 7
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Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962)
Petitioner Griggs alleged that his residential property, adjacent to the
Greater Pittsburgh Airport, owned and operated by Allegheny County,
was appropriated as a result of extremely low flights of aircraft in takeoff and landing procedures. A Board of Viewers' reported that the respondent had taken an air easement valued at $12,690 over petitioner's
property.
The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County dismissed the
exceptions of both parties to the Viewers' report.' However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, even if there had been a taking, the
respondent was not liable.3 On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court held that respondent had taken an air easement for which it must
pay compensation.
The issue of proper party defendant has been rarely litigated in air
easement cases, since most suits have alleged a "taking" by military aircraft on landing and take-off from bases owned by the United States.'
15. Applicants for admission to practice before the Patent Office must be of good moral
character and must show by passing an examination that they possess the legal, scientific, and
technical qualifications required to enable them to serve patent applicants effectively in the
presentation and prosecution of applications in the Patent Office. 37 C.F.R. 5 1.341(c)
(1960).
Out of 4933 persons who took the examination during the period from April 28, 1952,
through February 5, 1962, only 2534 passed (51.4%).
Letter from Helen I. Manning,
Clerk, Committee on Enrollment, Patent Office, to this writer, December 4, 1962.
16. In the Sperry case, the court concluded: "This injunction cannot and shall not in anywise be construed to affect any rights which the respondent has to practice before the Patent
Office when done outside this state." 140 So. 2d 587, 596 (Fla. 1962).
17. The court noted: "Were the courts of each state to control practice before the United
States Patent Office, thus usurping a right to control that which they cannot authorize in the
first instance ... then the courts of the 50 states, by ignoring the provisions of Article VI of
the United States Constitution . . . could render the provisions of Congress in regard to
practice before the Patent Office as enacted under the provisions of Article I, Section 8, of
the United States Constitution . . . a nullity." Battelle Memorial Institute v. Green, 133
U.S.P.Q. 49, 53 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
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Once it was established that property had been "taken" 5 in the constitutional sense under the fifth or fourteenth amendment,' there were
three potentially liable parties in the instant case: (1) the United States;
(2) the airlines which flew over petitioner's property; or (3) the County
of Allegheny which owned and operated the airport."
While the opinion in the landmark case of United States v.Causby8
held that, "the inconveniences which it [the airplane] causes are normally
not compensable under the Fifth Amendment,"' the Court went on to
award compensation for an air easement.'" Although the statute defining
"navigable airspace" in effect at the time of the Causby decision"' was
amended in 195812 to include the airspace needed for landing and takeoff, it has been held that this change does not affect a property owner's
cause of action for the "taking" of an air easement over his land.3
Justice Black, dissenting in Griggs,4 would have held the United
States liable on the theory that Congress, by the Federal Aviation Act of
1958,"5 had "taken" the air easement over petitioner's property, and "it
need not again be acquired by an airport."'"

Prior to the present case, several decisions, including Causby, held
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 1573-76 (1919), provides that the county court of common
pleas shall appoint three freeholders of the county or borough to sit as viewers to hear evidence
and witnesses of all interested parties and then to determine the value of the property taken;
injured, or destroyed.
2. No. 2384, July Term, Allegheny County C.P., Pa. (1958).
3. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123 (1961).
The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court based its decision in part on the fact that in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946), the Court did not indicate who maintained and operated the airport, which indicated to the Pennsylvania court that the United States Supreme Court believed this issue to be
irrelevant. Thus, the respondent was held not laible because it did not own or operate the
planes which did the taking.
4. Arnot., 77 A.L.IL2d 1344, 1362 (1961).
5. Sansom Street, Caplan's Appeal, 293 Pa. 483, 490, 143 AtI. 134, 136 (1928).
6. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
7. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 402 Pa. 411,423, 168 A.2d 123, 129 (1961).
8. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
9. Id. at 266.
10. Id. at 264, where the Court stated, "the flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but
do not touch it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional
entry upon it."
11. Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 574 (1926), "* Navigable air space means airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight .... prescribed by regulations issued under
the Act.
12. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 STAT. 739 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (24) (1961),
"'Navigable airspace' means airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by
regulations issued under this Act, and shall include airspace needed to insure safety in take-off
and landing of aircraft."
13. Matson v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 225, 171 F. Supp. 283 (1959).
14. 369 U.S. 84, 90 (1962).
15. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 STAT. 739 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (24) (1961).
16. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 93 (1962).
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the United States liable for "taking" air easements in the landing and
take-off of military aircraft, although the airport was owned and
operated by a municipality or a municipal authority.'" Of these cases,
only in Matson v. United States"8 was the liability of the owner and operator of the airport discussed. There, the court concluded that while it
was desirable that the airport owners, who normally have eminent domain
power, should take enough land for a glide area, the "lack of resources
and of knowledge as to possible future aviation developments has limited
the use of such arrangements."'" In these cases, while the United States
leased the airports jointly or concurrently with other users, the owners
and operators of the airports were not parties to the suit; therefore, there
was no determination of their liability.
In reversing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the United States
Supreme Court relied primarily upon its finding of no liability on the
part of the United States and the airlines which leased the airport. The
Court found the United States was not liable because it was the local
government which decided to build the airport and determined where
it was to be located.2" The majority opinion brushed aside the fact
that the "master plan"'" had been approved by the Civil Aeronautics
Administration and the fact that the United States agreed to pay the
majority of the project costs.m
The Supreme Court held the airlines not liable because: (1) their
leases gave them the right to land and take-off; (2) no flights violated
C.A.A. regulations; and (3) no flights were lower than necessary for
safe landing or take-off.28
The Court then concluded that by established standards" the respondent, Allegheny County, had not acquired the necessary property for
the approach areas to the runway.25 Therefore, the owner and operator
of the airport was the party liable for the "taking" of the air easement.
17.
(Ct.
18.
19.
20.

United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Wright v. United States, 279 F.2d 517
Cl. 1960); Matson v. United States, 145 Ct. CL 225, 171 F. Supp. 283 (1959).
145 Ct. Cf. 225, 171 F. Supp. 283 (1959).
Id. at 229, 171 F. Supp. at 286.
Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962).

21. National Airport Act, 60 STAT. 174-76 (1946). The local authority was required to
design the plan for the airport and receive the approval of the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Now the approval must be given by the Federal Aviation Agency Administrator. 72

STAT.807 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1108 (1961).
22.

Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 85 (1962).

23.

Id. at 86-87.

24. Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
25. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1962). The Court made an analogy
by stating, "A county that designed and constructed a bridge would not have a usable facility
unless it had at least an easement over the land necessary for the approaches to the bridge.
Why should one who designs, constructs, and uses an airport be in a more favorable position
so far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned?"
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The Supreme Court has decided that in air easement cases in which
neither the United States nor the airlines are negligent, and which are not
military in nature, the proper party defendant is the owner and operator
of the airport. This decision places the liability on the party best able
to assure proper condemnation of property adjoining airports. It would
place an intolerable burden on the property owner to require him to
prove which airline damaged his property and to what extent." In addition, it would seem unfair to penalize the airlines for acts over which
they have no control.
Whether, on the basis of this decision, the owners and operators
of airports who lease their fields to the United States for the landing
and take-off of military aircraft will be liable for the "taking" of air easements must still be decided. In any event, the owner and operator of an
airport is a proper party defendant
JAMES A. LAURENSON
26. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 402 Pa. 411, 430, 168 A.2d 123, 132 (1961).
emlly Note, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1581 (1961).
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